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The internalisation level of sustainability issues varies among topics and among countries. 
Companies give up less internalised issues for more internalised ones. Discrepancies between 
legal, market and cultural internalisation lead to different escape strategies: firms develop a high 
level environmental management system and they have nice sustainability policy and reports. 
These achievements cover the fact that their total emission keeps increasing and they do not 
proceed in solving the most crucial global community or corporate governance problems. 
‘Escaper’ firms are often qualified as ‘leading’ ones, as a current stream of research is also 
‘escapist’: it puts too much emphasis on sustainability efforts as compared to sustainability 
performance. Genuine strategies focus on hardcore sustainability issues and absolute effects 
rather than on issues easily solved and have high PR effects. They allow for growth in innovative 
firms, if they crowd out less efficient or more polluting ones. They produce positive 
environmental value added when sector average eco-efficiency is used as benchmark and do not 
accelerate market expansion and consumerism. 
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1. Internalisation of sustainability issues 
Many authors have studied trade-offs between economic and environmental performance for 
decades. Researchers, however, have just recently started to survey how sustainability issues are 
prioritised. Trade-offs heavily depend on company internalisation of different sustainability 
issues. Internalisation of problems means that the consequences of unsustainable company 
practices devolve upon the company. The more an issue is internalised, the less it interferes with 
business interests. For example, investing in environmental technologies might result in negative 
profit implications without regulation. Good environmental performance, however, is a 
precondition for meeting business goals, if withdrawal of operational permits is a threat in the 
case of negligence.  
 
Harvard professor Kornai (1992) denotes three possible forms of coordination in the economy: 
bureaucratic, market and ethical. Legal coordination manifests in the emergence of laws while 
market coordination relates to prices. Ethical (or, in other words cultural) coordination may 
dominate legal requirements. Corruption and tax evasion are illegal throughout the world, yet 
remain facts of life in many countries. Similarly, several cultures let pollution go unchallenged, 
even if it breaks the law.  
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Internalisation can also take the form of legal requirements, market mechanisms, or ethical 
pressure. High energy prices promote efficiency measures through the market mechanism and 
lead to reduced emissions of global pollutants. Wasteful technology leads to high production 
costs in an era of skyrocketing energy prices. Voluntary guidelines fall into the category of ethical 
coordination. (see Zadek 1998) They are implemented either because managers act ethically or 
because they want to impress their ethical stakeholders. For example, the unacceptable 
employment of children in developing countries may lead to NGO protests or consumer boycotts 
in the industrialised world. Consequently, companies can foresee financial impacts in case of 
questionable business practice. 
 
The level of company internalisation of various sustainability issues differs (see table 1). 
Environmental performance, as well as safety issues, are better absorbed than most social issues, 
but less than economic ones. Elusive expectations regarding social issues are often hard to 
actualise in practice. This enables firms to trade off sustainability issues. They can build up a 
positive picture on their sustainability performance based on some well-internalised and well 
manageable issues, while leaving harder issues unaddressed. The problem is complicated by the 
difficulties in sustainability measurement: commensurability of various issues is not always 
proportional to their importance. Consequently, we arrive at a policy-performance and scope-
depth paradox to be discussed later in the article 
 
Table 1. Internalisation of certain sustainability issues 
Example Level of 
internalis
ation 
Type of 
internalisat
ion 
Way of 
internalisation 
Escape 
possibilities 
Cost of 
implementatio
n minus cost 
of breach 
Major unsolved 
issues 
Worker safety 
issues 
Food safety 
NOx emission 
Very high Legal Target values or 
technology 
standards 
 
Difficult to escape 
(relocation, 
outsourcing) 
Negative 
(infringement 
might result in 
a loss of 
operation 
permit) 
Workplace 
climate, 
monotonous jobs, 
 
Eco-efficiency High market High energy prices Limited 
possibilities for 
relocation 
Might be 
negative 
(See Frondel et 
al. 2007) 
Decreasing eco-
effectiveness 
Reduction of 
green house 
gas emission 
Moderate Legal and 
market 
combined 
Marketable 
permits. (Gives 
more flexibility 
than targets). 
Compensation, 
relocation, 
emission leakage 
Sometimes 
negative, more 
often positive 
Increasing GHG 
emission at global 
level 
Anti 
discrimination 
policy  
Moderate
-low 
Ethical or 
legal 
Laws apply only to 
policy. They don’t 
define target 
values. 
Nice policy but bad 
performance (low 
% of minorities) 
Positive Employment of 
handicapped and 
minorities 
Community 
relationship  
Low Ethical Voluntary 
guidelines, NGO 
activity 
Focusing on minor 
issues: 
compensation to 
local communities, 
sponsoring activity 
Positive Community 
defencelessness to 
relocation 
decisions, 
defencelessness of 
local suppliers to 
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commercial buyers 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Firms can manage trade-offs by: 
 focusing on more internalised and least-cost sustainability issues; 
 focusing on more quantifiable issues.. 
 
Brown and Fraser (2006: 108.) also claim that “many companies are more concerned with the 
image rather than the substance of ‘corporate citizenship’ and ‘sustainable development’.” 
 
This paper delineates firm level ‘escape’ strategies that allow firms to build up a positive 
sustainability image while escaping from solving core sustainability issues. The next two sections 
describe two measurement paradoxes that make such escapes possible: the policy-performance 
paradox and the scope-depth paradox. As background, a short theoretical overview of escape 
strategies is provided, followed by a test of how frequent these strategies are in practice. A former 
OECD survey with more than 4,000 responses will be used for this purpose. 
 
2. The policy – performance paradox 
The policy-performance paradox suggests that enhanced sustainability efforts may be coupled 
with a deteriorating sustainability performance. 
 
Bebbington (2001) warns that one should be careful about using sustainable development to mean 
“good environmental management”. Sustainable development is a concept designed to address 
the question: what kind of economic system would lead to everyone’s needs being met in an 
ecologically sustainable and socially just manner? While “good environmental management” is 
therefore part of the sustainable development agenda, it is not a central part of the debate.   
 
Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations of three indicators: the environmental sustainability 
indices for countries, developed at Yale University (Esty et al. 2005: 1); the corresponding 
responsible competitiveness scores (AcountAbility 2007); and the ecological footprints. The 
environmental sustainability index (ESI) embraces five components such as environmental 
systems, reducing environmental stresses, reducing human vulnerability and global stewardship. 
It is an exceptionally complex indicator covering both policy-focused and performance-focused 
elements. Countries with the best sustainability policies and highest ESI rankings ‘boast’ the 
largest ecological footprint. Better sustainability policy is supposed to lead to better sustainability 
performance. Nonetheless, recent research predicts further growth of the ecological footprint and 
stable ecological deficit in Europe and North America despite their impressive policy efforts 
(Lenzen et al. 2007). 
 
Table 2. Correlation among country-level sustainability indices 
    
Responsible 
Competitiven
ess Index, 
2007 ESI 
Ecological 
footprint 
Responsible 
Competitiveness 
Pearson Correlation 1 .546(**) .721(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 
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Index, 2007 N 108 104 103 
ESI Pearson Correlation .546(**) 1 .356(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 
N 104 145 138 
Ecological footprint Pearson Correlation .721(**) .356(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   
N 103 138 143 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Countries that are considered the most proficient ‘social enablers’ on the AccountAbility country 
rating face severe social problems: namely aging, and a decreasing birth rate. With no immigrants 
from other parts of the world, Europe will face the consequences of a declining population, an 
aging society and crises in the pension system. Can we call a society ‘sustainable’ if it is not 
capable of preserving a stable population level? 
 
Industries with the worst reputation on sustainability issues often produce the nicest sustainability 
policies. Is a nice policy capable of hiding a deficient performance? Firms too often focus on the 
policy or effort side rather than on the impact. The two are only weakly correlated, as indicated by 
the following data: Table 3 shows the two-tailed Pearson correlation among AccountAbility 
scores of Fortune 100 companies. Impact is only weakly correlated with engagement or strategy. 
Europe boasts of being host to some 90 percent of the most accountable companies. However, the 
ecological footprint of Europe is increasing, and Europe would be in trouble in meeting its Kyoto 
targets without counting in the low level green house gas (GHG) emissions of the new EU 
accession countries. In theory, better sustainability strategy is supposed to lead to a better 
sustainability position. There is no indication, however, that this will actually come about in the 
near future.  
 
Table 3. Correlation between the Accountability rating scores of Fortune 100 companies 
    Strategy 
Govern-
ance 
Engage-
ment Impact 
Strategy   
1 .807(**) .765(**) 
.352(**
) 
      .000 .000 .000 
Governance   
.807(**) 1 .798(**) 
.393(**
) 
    .000   .000 .000 
Engagement   
.765(**) .798(**) 1 
.306(**
) 
    .000 .000   .002 
Impact   .352(**) .393(**) .306(**) 1 
    .000 .000 .002   
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The problems described above can be studied at any level of the economy. This would, however, 
go well beyond the scope of this article, so this paper will address the policy-performance 
paradox at firm level  
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3. The scope versus depth paradox 
The scope-depth paradox proposes a trade-off existing between the scope and the depth of 
sustainability agendas. The more we expand the list of items, the less we are able to capture most 
crucial issues. 
 
Statistics may tell us everything about nothing or nothing about everything. Sustainability and 
CSR reports are gaining ground over more narrowly-focused environmental and social reports in 
Europe (ESRA 2008). GRI Guidelines are comprised of about 60 different indicators on 7 
sustainability domains. The price is that we can easily get lost in details and also attention will get 
scattered between topics. Progress in marginal issues can easily mask failure in vital ones. Less 
costly sponsorship activities may disguise the defencelessness of communities to shut-down and 
relocation decisions. 
 
Researchers often suffer from the multifaceted and complex nature of sustainability. They 
struggle when they are supposed to aggregate indicators for diverse topics, such as environmental 
impacts, workplace accidents, corporate governance, and community involvement.  
 
When weighting is applied (AccountAbility 2007; Srdjevic et al. 2007), the analysis can always 
be criticized on the basis of who attributed the weighting, how topics were prioritised and 
whether the weights are stable over a reasonable period of time. The problems of weighting 
cannot be circumvented though, and the level of difficulty increases as the number of issues is 
rising. Different sustainability issues have different levels of importance. How should anti-
discrimination company policy be valued if we do not survive climate change? 
 
Several researchers are attempting to overcome the problem of comparing apples with oranges by 
attributing equal weight to each topic (see Ramos and Melo 2006). By doing it however, marginal 
issues can easily cover up substantial ones. Broadening the scope further amplifies the problem 
by dredging up even more issues. Others try to organise the variety of issues in a more 
perspicuous way, so that impacts, trade-offs, alternatives or achievements can be more easily 
assessed. (Bonachi and Rinaldi 2007; Figge et al. 2002; Wagner and Schaltegger 2006). The 
resulting picture is still far too complex. 
 
Stakeholders are able to transmit and aggregate hard-to-pin-down cultural pressures on a variety 
of topics towards firms. It is a central determinant factor of environmental proactivity (González-
Benito and González-Benito 2006). It will, however, lead us to the problem of power distribution 
among stakeholder groups regarding sustainability issues. 
 
A possible solution may involve better internalisation of sustainability topics by law or by market 
instruments, in order that monitoring laws or prices be sufficient for managing most topics. 
 
4. Overcoming the paradoxes 
Researchers are becoming more aware of the traps hidden in the policy-performance and the 
scope-depth paradoxes. Recently, new concepts were developed for measuring companies’ 
sustainability positions or at least changes in these positions. The latest models are more directed 
towards performance measurement than to policy measurement and address well-defined and 
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substantial issues.  
Figge and Hahn (2006) have developed a relative measure called Sustainability Value Added 
which corresponds to the economic value that is created by a level of eco-efficiency above the 
benchmark level: 
 
EnVA = (Eco-efficiencycompany – Ecoefficiencybenchmark) * Environmental impact added company 
 (1) 
 
It can be expressed as the product of the value spread and the level of resource use. Sustainable 
value measures corporate contribution to sustainability in an unprecedented way. Sustainability 
Value Added is based on information readily available on the market and can be used to 
determine whether the company is approaching sustainability or moving away from it. This paper 
builds on a simplified version of the Environmental Value Added concept. EnVA can be used to 
differentiate genuine strategies from escape strategies. Sector average eco-efficiency can be used 
as a benchmark. 
 
Xie and Hayase (2007) have developed the Environmental Intensity Change Index (EICI) – the 
ratio of the environmental impact in the evaluation period to that of the base period. One of their 
most interesting findings confirms that the EICI and the resulting evaluations are comparable 
across sub-sectors. This indicates that the EICI has the advantage of eliminating the influence of 
process type. Thus, the Environmental Intensity Change Index can be used as a performance-
based indicator for differentiating among environmental strategies. It requires even less 
information than EnVA and can be easily used in empirical studies. 
 
This paper contributes to this stream of research by developing an effect-based (or impact-based) 
strategic concept which is tested on a large sample of 4,000 companies. 
 
The following section will focus on corporate escape strategies that are built on the policy-
performance and scope-depth paradoxes in order to combine a positive image at low cost. 
 
5. ‘Escape’ strategies for managing tradeoffs 
The paradoxes described in the previous sections offer a wide range of possibilities for managing 
tradeoffs between sustainability issues in an easy and inexpensive way. Eco-efficiency is mainly 
concerned about doing more with using less, thus improving the relative performance on 
indicators such as decreasing harmful emission/economic output or increasing the value of 
economic output/natural resource input. While companies’ eco-efficiency improves and progress 
is demonstrated in certain fields, the same companies may even amplify their contribution to 
global unsustainability. The difference between eco-efficiency and eco-effectiveness is nicely 
captured in Dyllick and Hockerts (2002: 136-137). “Ecological sustainability is not only 
concerned with relative improvements (…) Due to the problems of non-substitutability, non 
linearity and irreversibility, it has also to consider absolute thresholds.” 
 
Strategies leading to this result are labelled ‘escape strategies’. Escape strategies typically address 
marginal sustainability topics while missing the opportunity to solve crucial issues. Their major 
characteristics are: 
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 Focusing on eco-efficiency rather than eco-effectiveness. Increasing sales typically offset 
eco-efficiency improvements. 
 Focusing on measures, instead of performance. For example: focusing on supply chain 
audits rather than supply chain impact reduction; energy saving measures rather than real 
cutback of energy used; development, promotion and publicity of anti-discrimination 
policy rather than fair composition of human resources. 
 Incremental steps in marginal issues cover up the incapability to improve in core 
sustainability issues. For example, community relations are managed by inexpensive 
sponsorship. 
 Decreasing direct impacts by passing them over to others. Shifting direct impacts to others 
may take different forms: 
o Outsourcing of risky, polluting or other undesirable activities. In this manner, 
companies can get rid of some activities negatively affecting sustainability 
performance. They may opt to buy (instead of make) products which are created by 
using inexpensive child labour or emitting massive amounts of pollution. 
Companies tend to also outsource risky laboratory activities and the burden of 
waste management. Although companies cannot get rid of responsibility per se, 
they can still reduce their responsibility for waste by outsourcing. No question, 
supply chain management and procurement offer unbeatable opportunities in 
reaching and greening SMEs that are usually invisible to regulators (Preuss 2005). 
Nonetheless, greening the supply chain reduces responsibility for corporations to 
green their own domain. The sustainability impacts of inputs and intermediaries 
are difficult to capture.  
o Compensation. A compensation strategy might lead to conflicting consequences in 
the short and long run. Positive short term, but negative long-term impacts prevail 
when companies use compensation to offset environmental impacts while 
penetrating new markets. Market growth accelerates environmental degradation 
which may outweigh the temporal gains from reduced impacts. (Figge and Hahn 
2006; Dyllick and Hockerts 2002; Schnitzer 1999). Multinational enterprises 
cannot resist infiltrating into the new markets of emerging countries. The effects 
are positive in both long and short run only when a more eco-efficient company 
crowds out a less eco-efficient competitor.  
o Relocating certain activities to countries with less stringent expectations (pollution 
havens). Several countries do not even oblige companies to measure their 
discharges to the environment. A high number of studies have been devoted to 
analysing the phenomena of pollution havens (see Kolk 2000). They have led to 
contradictory results. Siting decisions have a multifaceted nature; the environment 
is only one contributing factor among others in the complex game. Nevertheless, if 
we regard environmental strategies as a pattern rather than a plan (Wehrmeyer 
1999) we cannot deny the fact that some industries of high income counties are 
repositioning to enter emerging countries, but still serve the needs of consumers in 
the ‘developed’ world. Consumers in ‘developed’ countries are responsible for a 
significant part of the pollution emitted in China. 
o Emission leakage. Pinkse and Kolk (2007) speak about the risk of ‘emission 
leakage’ to other states when discrepancies are present in emissions trading 
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schemes. 
 
Prevailing escape strategies are not just the responsibility of companies. If members of society 
pretend to strive toward sustainability through legislation while maintaining their accustomed 
lifestyles, then companies may also pretend making full efforts towards sustainability, while 
trading core sustainability issues for marginal achievements. 
 
6. ‘Genuine’ strategies for improving sustainability 
Although the focus of this paper are escape strategies, the reader may be interested in a short 
description of perceptions regarding genuine strategies. Genuine strategies focus on hardcore 
sustainability issues and effects, rather than putting marginal efforts in the spotlight. They are 
“more aggressive, more creative, more unorthodox. It is a sort of corporate environmentalism that 
can lead to substantial breakthroughs” (Frankel 2001: 282). Genuine strategies allow for growth 
in innovative firms, if they crowd out less efficient or more polluting ones. They produce positive 
environmental value added when sector average eco-efficiency is used as benchmark (Figge and 
Hahn 2006). Another aspect of genuine efforts presumes that firm activity does not accelerate 
market expansion and consumerism. Thus, global environmental load must decrease due to 
developments from the innovative firm. Clean sectors are allowed to expand if they crowd out 
industries with a higher environmental burden. For example, web-based outlets could crowd out 
conventional outlets which require customers to drive from shop to shop. 
 
Genuine strategies embrace honest efforts in order to reduce the unsustainable environmental 
burden (by addressing issues such as total pollution). They include: 
 Radical product development. E.g. alternative energy, passively heated housing solutions 
with an ultra-low energy demand and a high level of information technology. 
 Break-through production technology innovations. 
 Redefining the core business or following a “blue ocean strategy” (Kim and Mauborgne 
2005). An oil company may redefine itself as an energy company and invest in renewable 
energy. Polonsky and Rosenberger (2001) claim that consumers do not need to actually 
own products if there are other ways of delivering their needs. For example, people can 
purchase access to Toyota’s electronic automobile fleet and travel short distances. 
 Life style marketing. Discouraging energy and material-intensive ways of life.  
 Management techniques, e.g. spreading best practice and best technologies among 
subsidiaries (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Denso 2004). 
 Local orientation. Relying more on local suppliers and local resources. Locally-oriented 
firms have limited growth potential and are not as much responsible for accelerating 
unsustainable economic growth as global firms. They also have important social functions 
within the community. 
 
Runhaar et al. (2008) found that environmental leaders comprise a heterogeneous group of 
companies in their explorative research. According to their typology, sustainability was 
manifested as a main goal only in one subgroup of SMEs. It formed a secondary goal in another 
SME group and in ‘large company’ environmental leaders.  
 
Large corporations are suspected to possess some built-in inertia due to the variety of their 
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activities and sites, and follow dual strategies before going green. Genuine strategists should 
rather be hunted for among SME’s. This is not to say that the environmental performance of 
SME’s is better on average than larger companies: it is probably not.  
 
7. ‘Dual’ strategies 
Dual strategies combine genuine and escape strategies. One branch of a company follows a 
genuine approach, while most business activities resist change. The firm consents to one 
subsidiary going green, while keeping the others on track. On the one hand, it tests radical 
sustainability strategies and attempts to prepare for a carbon-constrained age. On the other hand, 
it insists on maintaining conventional cash-cow branches, no matter how their sustainability 
performance scores. Several big automotive corporations, as well as oil giants, follow this 
approach. They produce hybrid cars or have an alternative energy branch, but will not give up 
profits from oil or from big petrol guzzling cars. For this reason, they exhibit a mixed picture.  
 
BP is a typical example of a dualist. It is among the world’s top solar manufacturers and was the 
first company to introduce an in-site carbon compensation system. It was the number one on 
AccountAbility rating in 2007. In 2000, BP tried to rebrand itself as being ‘beyond petrol’, 
although this campaign was ended due to credibility issues – BP is a company which profits 
mostly from the oil business.  
 
Companies following a genuine strategy, escape strategy or dual strategy are typically labelled 
‘proactive’, ‘leading’ or ‘innovative’ without distinction in the research literature (Azzone 1994; 
Hunt and Auster 1990; Steger 1988). 
 
8. Conformists and browns 
Conformists comply with legal requirements and the most pressing social expectations, but they 
do not go beyond that. Their eco-efficiency is close to the industry average. Their environmental 
impact may increase or decrease depending on their business performance. They are not 
concerned about building a superior environmental image, but they follow the usual industrial 
practice. 
 
Browns focus on business goals and are involved in environmental actions only if such actions 
support their financial interests in an evident way, in the short run. They are characterised by a 
decreasing level of eco-efficiency or uncompromising market expansion. Their eco-efficiency 
may be under the sector average. Their contribution to global problems is increasing. They may or 
may not have an environmental policy and environmental strategy. They may or may not comply 
with regulation.  
 
Table 4 outlines the above-mentioned strategies.  
 
Table 4. Strategies for ecological sustainability 
  Eco-efficiency 
  Decreasing or 
stagnating 
Increasing 
Contribution to 
global 
Decreasing or 
stagnating 
Muddling or 
conforming 
Genuine strategy 
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environmental 
impacts  
Increasing Brown Escape strategy 
 
9. Environmental Strategies in Practice 
In order to test the applicability of the above-mentioned strategic categories, I used the database 
of the OECD survey on Environmental Policy Tools and Firm Level Management Practices 
(2003) (Johnston et al. 2007). Although the database is somewhat outdated and was prepared for 
a different purpose, the advantage of the availability of a large sample, with more than 4,000 
facilities, international and intersectoral data outweighs its limitations and makes it extremely 
useful for an explorative survey. The whole database became available for participating 
institutions only after the national reports were published (see Damall et al. 2004; Kerekes et al. 
2004; or Rennings et al. 2004 for national results). 
 
The sample includes manufacturing facilities with more than 50 employees in seven OECD 
countries (United States, Canada, France, Norway, Hungary, Germany and Japan). The postal 
survey was distributed in early 2003, targeted at chief executive officers and environmental 
managers (identified where possible). Table 5 gives the country and size distribution of facilities. 
More detailed sample descriptions and some interesting findings can be found in studies using the 
results of the same survey (see Frondel et al. 2007; Damall et al. 2004; Kerekes et al. 2004 or 
Rennings et al. 2004). 
 
Table 5. Distribution of facilities by size in the OECD sample 
 CDN FRA DEU HUN JPN NOR USA Total 
50-99 76 85 351 66 661 155 96 1490 
100-
249 
68 81 278 198 508 102 130 1365 
250-
499 
62 39 130 101 178 36 130 676 
>500 50 64 139 101 152 16 133 655 
Total 256 269 898 466 1499 309 489 4186 
 
Unfortunately, no such term as ‘ecological deficit’ for companies exists. While we can estimate 
the aggregate firm level footprint, we have no reliable guide to the justifiable level of biocapacity 
that should limit firm activities. Thus, we will pay our attention to the signs of change in global 
impacts. 
 
Frondel et al. (2006) found that 76.8% of the sample facilities invest in cleaner production 
technologies. This is a high percentage. Can we assume that such innovation improves the 
sustainability position of companies? Eco-efficiency suggests that it is possible to increase 
productivity while simultaneously improving environmental performance (Burnett and Hansen 
2008; Lehman 2002; Bebbington 2001). Environmental gains from eco-efficiency can, however, 
be easily counterbalanced when eco-efficiency is coupled with a significant increase in sales. 
Table 6 shows the distribution of facilities based on eco-efficiency and growth patterns. Data 
were purged from country specific inflation. EU energy efficiency studies indicate that the 
economic potential for energy efficiency improvement typically ranges from 1.4% to 2.7% per 
year, whereas the technical potential may be up to 2.2%–3.5% per year (IPCC Workgroup III 
2001). An average growth in sales beyond 3.5% would probably not be consistent with 
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sustainability in the long run. Such growth is labelled in the current analysis as growth in sales to 
a ‘large extent’. Despite the cleaner production efforts of many companies, 57.4% of them 
probably operate in the red zone of increasing global impacts. Questionable impact levels mean 
that we cannot classify impacts without additional numerical data regarding facility level and 
sector level eco-efficiency. This finding may be seen as a warning: despite the wide scope of 
environmental efforts reported, most facilities are backing away from sustainability, rather than 
moving towards it.  
 
Table 6. Change in the emission of global pollutants (% of facilities) 
Change in the 
environmental impacts 
per unit of output in 
global pollutants 
(eco-efficiency) 
Change in value of shipments in the last three years (growth effect) 
has decreased to a 
large extent has decreased 
has stayed about 
the same 
has increased 
has increased to a 
large extent 
Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % 
Significant decrease 0.8 0.9 0.1 1.2 2.1 
Decrease 5.4 2.5 0.7 6.2 14.0 
No change 11.8 7.7 2.7 15.1 25.3 
Increase - 0.4 0.1 0.9 1.9 
 
Unfortunately, only 1,554 facilities (less than 40%) provided data on their average change in 
shipments over the last three years. The results are thus rather explorative and cannot be 
generalized. Most facilities answered only to the categorical version of the same question (a 
‘significant decrease’, ‘decrease’, ‘stagnating’, ‘increase’ or ‘significant increase’ in shipments). 
The level of change, however, is perceived very differently from an environmental viewpoint than 
from the business perspective. The median of ‘some increase’ was 5.8% with a mean of 6.49% 
annually – far too much to be offset by gains in eco-efficiency. Thus, using the categorical 
version of this question would have resulted in misleading findings. 
 
Tobacco and fuel sectors were found to apply the highest number of environmental management 
tools, averaging 7 and 5.6 respectively, as compared to the sample mean of 3.5. The result is 
presumably associated with high levels of stakeholder pressure that these industries face, rather 
than with their sustainability performance. This finding reinforces the notion of the image-
building role of environmental management and its possible utilisation in an escape strategy. This 
is not to say that developing an EMS is a kind of juggling act. EMS may play an important role in 
controlling hazards, improving environmental performance and preventing accidents – but it is 
not a correct sole indicator of sustainability. 
 
A two-step cluster analysis was carried out to reveal sustainability strategies based on the level of 
environmental management and change in the emission of global pollutants. The two-step cluster 
analysis procedure is an exploratory tool that is applicable for analyzing large data files. It can 
simultaneously handle continuous and categorical variables and is robust enough to some 
departure from the homogeneity-of-variance or the independency of variables criteria. 
 
Tables 7, 8 and 9 show the results of the analysis. The results do not change significantly if we 
enter further environmental management variables into our analysis for controlling the number of 
areas where environmental actions were taken, or showing the level of environmental monitoring. 
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Changing the number of clusters would merge or divide the clusters further, but would not change 
their substance. The tables show SPSS results through applying strategy designations to the 
clusters.  
 
Table 7. Results of the two-step cluster analysis – Cluster Distribution 
  N 
% of 
Combined % of Total 
Cluster 1 257 30.1% 6.1% 
2 233 27.3% 5.6% 
3 249 29.1% 5.9% 
4 84 9.8% 2.0% 
5 32 3.7% .8% 
Combined 855 100.0% 20.4% 
Excluded Cases 3331   79.6% 
Total 4186   100.0% 
 
Table 8. Results of the two-step cluster analysis – Centroids 
  No of environmental anagement tools applied 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
Cluster Escapers 6.1634 1.44581 
  Browns 1.2103 1.14224 
  Muddling 3.8795 2.67183 
  Questionable 5.0357 2.70852 
  Stagnating and 
genuine 
4.2813 2.55563 
  Combined 3.9673 2.76544 
 
Table 9. Results of the two-step cluster analysis – Change in the emission of global pollutants (% 
of facilities) 
  Growing stagnating questionable decreasing 
decreasing 
with business 
problems 
  n % n % N % n % n % 
 Escapers 257 52.4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 
  Browns 233 47.6% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 
  Muddling 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 249 100% 
  ? 0 .0% 0 .0% 84 100% 0 .0% 0 .0% 
  Stagnating and 
genuine 
0 .0% 25 100% 0 .0% 7 100% 0 .0% 
  Combined 490 100% 25 100% 84 100% 7 100% 249 100% 
 
Our analysis demonstrates that Escapers are characterized as employing by far the highest level of 
environmental management, averaging more than 6 tools employed, while their total global 
pollutant emission escalates. Browns make use of only one environmental management tool on 
average and they also increase GHG emissions. Muddling is associated with decreasing 
ecological impacts and falling sales. Economic – rather than ecological – unsustainability is 
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paramount in their case. Further information is needed to be able to classify questionable facilities 
which typically utilise a relatively high number of environmental management instruments. This 
category may hide a certain number of genuine strategists. Finally, we have a mixed cluster of 
stagnating facilities and genuine strategists. 
 
Surprisingly, an escape strategy is the most common one among companies who responded: 257 
out of the 855 facilities follow this approach (table 10). It is the dominant strategy in the electrical 
machinery and electronic equipment sectors as well as in the motor vehicle sector, presumably 
because of the high growth rates typical of these industries. A certain level of crowding effect 
might be possible in the electrical machinery and electronics industry (that is, their global impact 
may be less than their emissions suggest). Such an effect is certainly not expected in the motor 
vehicle industry. Development of an environmental management system is their response to 
forceful stakeholder pressure and plays an essential role in image building. Escape strategies are 
also very common in the chemical and paper industry.  
 
Table 10. Cluster distribution in selected industrial sectors (number of facilities) 
  
Food 
and 
beverag
es Paper 
Chem
i-cal 
Rubber 
and 
plastics 
Basic 
metals 
Fabricat
ed 
metal 
Other 
machin
ery 
Electric
al 
machin
ery 
Motor 
vehicl
es 
Other 
transp
ort 
equip
ment 
Escapers 19 11 21 25 18 33 21 30 12 13 
Browns 30 5 18 15 12 34 28 16 6 11 
Muddling 18 10 18 20 21 38 24 17 5 11 
? 11 3 9 4 6 12 6 10 2 4 
Mixed 
stagnating 
and genuine 
5 2 3 5 2 - 1 4 - - 
 
Table 11 presents strategy frequencies in relation to facility size. ‘Brown’ is the most common 
strategy type among SME’s, while the Escape strategy is most frequent among larger facilities. 
SME’s operate under low stakeholder pressure, so they can be honest about their negligence of 
the sustainability agenda. 
 
Table 11. Cluster distribution by facility size (number of facilities) 
 Facility size 
  50-99 100-249 250-499 500 or more 
 Escapers 21.0% 26.5% 42.7% 39.1% 
  Browns 43.0% 29.6% 14.0% 10.9% 
  Muddling 28.0% 31.3% 26.8% 31.5% 
  ? 5.1% 10.7% 10.2% 14.1% 
  Mixed stagnating and 
genuine 
2.8% 2.1% 6.4% 4.3% 
 
10. Limitations and future research 
The empirical research was built on a formal OECD survey instrument designed for another 
purpose. The large database enabled the preparation of structured tables, but limited the depth of 
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research in certain important fields. Clustering firms into strategy patterns would require more 
detailed data regarding firm-level as well as mean industrial eco-efficiency.  
 
The survey has not provided sufficient information to evaluate the sustainability impacts of 
products, although product impacts may exceed process impacts in certain sectors such as motor 
vehicles. 
 
Regardless of the limitations highlighted above, this research suggests that to avoid the trap of the 
policy-performance paradox requires that future research focuses more on eco-effectiveness and 
core sustainability issues, and less on the use of auxiliary indicators such as sustainability 
strategy, sustainability actions and eco-efficiency.  
 
11. Conclusions 
As we expand the scope of sustainability issues, we are at risk of letting most crucial issues slip 
through our fingers. Many companies show an increasing level of eco-efficiency and are able to 
point to a high level of sustainability policy, while their contribution to global unsustainability 
actually increases. Environmental management research is unable to reveal these strategies when 
it remains unable to properly handle the policy-performance and the scope-depth paradoxes. 
Discrepancies in internalisation on a variety of sustainability-related issues, as well as the two 
paradoxes, act together to bring ‘escape strategies’ into being. Escape strategies offer an 
inexpensive and easy way of managing trade-offs. They imply a focus on marginal sustainability 
issues and flight from crucial ones.  
 
The OECD survey showed that level of the environmental management system is a not a good 
indicator for sustainability performance. Environmental management is most developed in the 
fuel and the tobacco sector, which highlights their communication-driven response to high 
stakeholder pressure, rather than their sustainability.  
 
77% of the sample companies employed cleaner production related process changes rather than 
end-of-pipe ones. Despite this, some 57% of facilities have probably increased the emission of 
pollutants rather than decreased them. 10% of organisations operate in the questionable zone.  
 
We can easily define escape strategies in theory, but their identification in practice is heavy 
weather. The unavailability of environmental and business performance data and less-than-
adequate measuring techniques complicate the task. Several factors hinder more focused research 
on eco-effectiveness, rather than eco-efficiency. We know too little about the performance of 
SME’s regarding their emissions. They are usually not subject to regulatory reporting and do not 
measure their environmental performance. Increased eco-efficiency or eco-effectiveness may also 
result from several undistinguishable factors that obstruct evaluation: indicators ought to be 
purged from the distorting impact of frequent occasions of acquisitions, outsourcing, take-overs, 
emission leakage and changes in the product structure. This is currently impossible.  
 
A survey instrument is not sufficient to reveal escape strategies, as it is unable to catch frequent 
organisational changes. Therefore, researchers must utilise qualitative research. They also have to 
further develop performance-based measurement. Ecological sustainability indicators must be 
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based on firm eco-efficiency compared to the sector average, change in shipments, and global 
growth impacts through market expansion and crowding effect. The resulting indicators then can 
be combined with financial ones to make a combined sustainability indicator, such as EnvVA. 
Applying too many indicators, on the other hand, will lead us back to the scope-depth paradox. 
 
Citizens and companies must acknowledge trade-offs and accept the price of sustainability: the 
high price of alternative energy, the hazards of nuclear energy, or a limited standard of living. 
Without this, companies will be able to escape real responsibility using greenwash strategies, and 
researchers remain able to pursue escapist views of company performance. Studies must shift the 
focus from policy to performance and from effort to effect in order to overcome this paradox. 
Society must also make credible and reliable signals about sustainability requirements to 
companies.  
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